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This paper models the Self-Sufﬁciency Project (SSP), a controlled randomized experi-
ment concerning welfare. The model of household behavior includes stochastic labor
market skill, job opportunities, and value of non-labor market time. All the variation
within and between treatment groups, jurisdictions (provinces), demographic groups,
and sub-experiments is derived from four underlying sources: policy variation, endoge-
nousselectionintotheexperimentalsamples,theSSPtreatmentsthemselves,anddifferent
mixturesover4underlyingtypes. Usingthevariationwithinthetreatmentgroupisquan-
titatively important for identifying the complex model: Efﬁcient GMM the parameters
are estimated precisely and variation within the treatment group is much more important
for identiﬁcation than either variation within the control group or between treatment and
control groups. The model tracks the primary moments well within sample and out-of-
sample except for under-estimating the difference in the entry sample. Predictions of the
estimated model are computed for different welfare reform experiments. The details of
the design are critical for interpretation of the results and it appears that the small SSP+
treatment may have longer lasting impacts than the an in-sample impact analysis would
suggest.
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TheSelf-SufﬁciencyProject(SSP)wasacontrolledrandomizedexperimentperformed
in two Canadian provinces designed to study whether long-term recipients of income as-
sistance (i.e. welfare) respond to earnings subsidies. The main SSP treatment group,
single parents on income assistance (IA) for at least one year, was offered a large supple-
ment to earnings if and when a full-time job was acquired within one year (and the parent
went off IA). The premise of the SSP, that it would induce sustained full-time employment
which would generate skills and thereby substantial wage gains, was partly fulﬁlled.
Approximately 35 percent of the treatment group qualiﬁed for the supplement and at the
peak that group had a 100 percent increase in full-time work and a 70 percent increase in
earnings relative to the controls. However, most of the impact disappeared soon after the
supplement expired (Michalopoulos et al. 2002).1 The hoped-for self-sufﬁciency through
endogenous wage gains failed to appear. Despite this, the careful and ambitious design
of the experiment provides a unique opportunity to study labor market dynamics among
low-income households.
This paper describes a forward-looking model of single parent households that pre-
dictslabormarketoutcomesbefore, during, andaftertheSSPexperiment. TheSSPcreates
exogenous variation in budget constraints and expected income that is used to identify a
rich model. The model is estimated using GMM on the ﬁrst 36 months of the (roughly) 54
months of experimental data. Results from the ﬁnal 18 months are compared to out-of-
sample predictions from the model, and counter-factual experiments are computed. The
experiments ask whether the impacts observed in the SSP are robust to modest changes in
thedesignoftheexperiment. Insomedimensionstheparametersoftheexperimentdonot
have a great effect on the model outcomes. In other dimensions it appears unwarranted
to extrapolate the experimental impact to related welfare policies without reference to a
1 Most of the work analyzing the SSP is discussed and summarized by the authors themselves in SRDC
2006.model of behavioral response to the experiment. In addition, the treatment in a small
sub-experiment that provided job-ﬁnding support is found to be effective for a segment
of the population.
To determine the value of using the treatment for estimation, standard errors are com-
putedwithinexperimentalgroups. Formanyparametersofthemodelthestandarderrors
explode when based only on the control samples, quantifying the notion that experimen-
tal variation helps identify a richer model than identiﬁed by control variation alone. The
richer model, if validated in other ways, may then be applicable in environments farther
than the sample than a weaker model. Surprisingly, re-scaled standard errors tend to fall
when based only on the treatment groups. Thus, without accounting for the direct cost
of offering the treatment, it may be more efﬁcient to have a larger treatment group that
control group when basing policy predictions on a model estimated from the experiment.
Low-income single parents face a number of constraints when trying to establish
a long-term attachment to the labor market. The well-known static tradeoffs between
income and leisure created by the welfare are illustrated in Figure 1. A household eligible
for an amount IAB is precluded from IA if they take some forms of non-government
outside support (denoted OS). Throughout the 1990s earnings up to SA=$200 per month
could be set aside without a reduction in beneﬁts. Thereafter beneﬁts were replaced by
earnings (in the ﬁgure 1-for-1). An indifference curve with optimal point A illustrates the
disincentive to work more than part-time under this budget.
Figure1alsodisplaysthebudgetunderthemainSSPtreatmentasasolidredline. The
parent always has the option of receiving IA, but receipt of the supplement requires they
choosenottotakeIA.Thus,SSPincomestartsatOSandhasaslopeequaltothewageuntil
the full-time work requirement is met. At this point, earnings are supplemented to be half
the difference between actual earnings and 3.9 times full-time earnings on a minimum
wage job. The parent is indifferent between staying on IA at point A and working full
time with the supplement at point B.
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If the induced shift to full-time work generates wage growth (through channels such
as learning-by-doing) then the untreated budget dynamically shifts up, shown as a mixed
blue line in Figure 1. After treatment ends the supplement budget disappears and a new
optimal choice is C. In this case the temporary SSP treatment can lessen the welfare trap
through employment changes that induce sufﬁcient wage growth.2
2 KeaneandMofﬁtt(1998)useanestimatedmodelofincomemaintenanceprogramsintheU.S.topredict
thatreformswithoutsuchafull-timeworkrequirementwouldsigniﬁcantlyincreasetotaltransferpayments
to poor households and shift many away from full-time work.
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son’s current skill relates to their labor market history. An inference is required on what
wageswouldbenowiftheparenthad(counter-factually)workedmoreandmoresteadily
in the past. Papers that address dynamic in welfare policy using non-experimental data
include Miller and Sanders (1997), Swan (1998), Kennan and Walker (2003), Keane and
Wolpin (2002), and Fang and Silverman (2003). This paper provides new evidence on
what labor market policies can do to affect welfare dependency by confronting a model
that captures many elements of the previous papers with the large and complex varia-
tion in static and dynamic incentives created by the SSP. Exploiting this variation yields
identiﬁcation of the time-varying and heterogeneous effects of income and opportunity
cost that underly patterns of welfare receipt. The experimental outcomes are used while
simultaneously making a household’s eligibility for the experiment endogenous to the
model. The results generated by the model are therefore applicable quite generally to
policies that would fundamentally alter the duration and incidence of welfare receipt.
II. The Environment
II.A States and Parameters
In the model a household’s situation each month outside the experiment is described
by nine endogenous state variables:
µend ´ (l p n x b s h d k): (1)
The state variables are listed in Table 1 and described in more detail in the Appendix.
Brieﬂy the variables are indicators or indices for: the parent lost their previous job; the
parent worked in the previous month; the earnings offer in the current job; the parent’s
skill based on previous experience; the upper bound on working hours in the current job;
the level of outside non-governmental support; the opportunity cost of time spent outside
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The ﬁrst two variables, l and p, do not affect the household’s decisions directly and are
tracked as state variables in order to match SSP results on job loss and quits.




µclock µexp µend µexog µpol
´
: (2)
Each state variable belongs exclusively to one of these sub-vectors. The other sub-vectors
are described as needed.
The demographic index d varies across households but not over time for a given
household. Characteristics treated as demographic in the SSP model are indicators for
province of residence and whether the parent has two or more children. Each of the D = 4
demographic groups has a vector of policy parameters,
ªp[d] ´ (IABd SAd CBd MWd): (2)
Theparametersarethemaximumlevelofincomeassistancebeneﬁts, theincomeset-aside
before beneﬁts are clawed back, the claw-back rate on beneﬁts, and full-time earnings on
a minimum wage job. The parameter values were illustrated in Figure 1 and listed below
in Table A.2.
The index for unobserved type, k, is also ﬁxed for a household and determines which
of K = 4 vectors of exogenous parameters pertains to the household:
¡[k] ´ (¨k ¦k ±k ½k): (3)
Exogenous parameters that shift utility are contained in ¨k. Parameters that shift the
evolution of state variables are contained in ¦k. The scalar ±k is the discount factor, and ½k
controls smoothing of choice probabilities. The elements of ¨k and ¦k and the exact roles
of ±k and ½k are described in the rest of this section.
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vector with elements ¸[d;k]. For example, ¸[1;2] is the second element of ¤[1] and equals
the proportion of k = 2 households in group d = 1. Only the proportions and policy
parameters ªp[d] vary with d. For example, no province dummy appears in the earnings-
offerdistribution. Instead,inter-provincialdifferencesaregeneratedbyadifferentmixture
oftypesacrossprovinces. Also,theopportunitycostoflabormarkettimedoesnotdepend
directly on the number of children. Instead, one-child households can be a different
mixture across unobserved types than 2+ households.
The exogenous vector contains all the estimated parameters:
µexog = (¤[1] ¢¢¢ ¤[4] ¡[1] ¢¢¢ ¡[4]): (4)
There are N = 19 parameters in ¡[k] leading to a total of K(D + N) = 4(4 + 18) = 88
exogenous parameters. Free parameters are fewer because three parameters in ¡[k] are
constrained to be equal across type (on the presumption that they are the least likely to be
identiﬁed for observed variation). Accounting for this and the fact that elements of ¤[d]
sum to 1 results in 3+4(19 ¡3)+3(4) = 79 parameters estimated from the data.
II.B Actions
Each month the parent chooses an action vector,
® ´ (m a i) 2 A(µ); (5)
containingthreevariables: labormarkethours,activejobsearch,andacceptanceofincome
assistance. The feasible set A(µ) imposes two restrictions. First, active job search while
working is ruled out: m > 0 or a = 1, but not both. Second, the parent faces an upper
bound on work hours: m · u(b) where b is a state variable speciﬁc to the current job. When
the parent has no job, b = 0. With a part-time job they can only work less than b =PT< 1
hoursrelativetofull-time. PTequalsthevalueintheSSPtreatmentof75%. Whenholding
a full-time job (b = 1) the parent can chose to work fewer hours. A parent holding a job
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found and accepted.
II.C Outcomes and Results
The combination of an action and a state, (®;µ), is referred to as an outcome. The state
next month, µ0, is randomly determined by the transition P fµ0 j®; µg (fully described in
the Appendix). Not all aspects of a household’s outcome can be observed by outsiders:
some states and some actions are unobserved. Understanding welfare and the incentive
to work involves many hidden states, including skill, job quality, and leisure-income
tradeoffs. The vector of measurements made from an outcome (®;µ) is denoted Y(®;µ).
Only some endogenous state variables in the SSP model are directly available in Y(®;µ):






U(®;µ) = Income(®;µ)+OS(®;µ) ¡C(®;µ): (6)
In turn, income is the sum of earnings, income assistance payments, and SSP payments:
Income(®;µ) ´ IA(®;µ)+TrueEarn(®;µ)+SUP(®;µ): (7)
Under-reporting of income while on IA is allowed, so measured earnings are a fraction
of TrueEarn. The components of (7) are deﬁned in the Appendix. The second term in (6)
is the sum of non-government transfers and additional utility (in dollar equivalent) from
forgoing IA:
OS(®;µ) ´ (1 ¡ i)s»IAB: (8)
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Outside support varies from month to month based on the endogenous variable, s. When
s changes the parent may go off welfare and rely on other sources of support with or
without any change in labor market status. A drop in s may push the parent back to
receiving IA. Because OS includes foregone stigma of the static form in Mofﬁtt (1983),
maximum OS is expressed as a factor of IAB, the maximum amount of IA the household
is entitled to. The parameter » is a positive exogenous value dependent on type k.
Three possible sets of feasible work hours (depending on b) are shown in Figure 2 as
ranges along the x axis starting from the right at zero work hours (m = 0). The x-axis is
non-markettimeexpressedasafractionoffull-timeemployment. They-axisisdollarsper
month, and the discrete values of m are indicated by vertical lines. The value of b changes
from one month to the next for various reasons. A non-working parent ﬁnds a job with
probability pj(®;µ), which will have an upper bound on m of either PT or 1. A working
parent loses a job permanently with probability ¼l and results in an upper bound of 0 next
month. A working parent can quit by setting m = 0. A parent who quits or is laid-off
can immediately engage in job search (a = 1), but a job offered that month begins the next
month. Thus leaving or losing a job is matched to cases where the parent experiences
at least one month not working. Job-to-job transitions are treated as the same job. The
model attributes growth in full-time equivalent earnings between contiguous jobs as skill
acquisition.
The cost of labor market time,
C(®;µ) = Wmaxº[m+ ·a]
c(h)
; (9)
is expressed as a fraction of Wmax, maximum possible earnings (deﬁned later). It depends
on working hours and search time when not working. Job-search is converted to work
time by the exogenous parameter ·. The cost of full-time work is then ºWmax.
The curvature of costs is determined by c(h). It shifts with h as described in the
Appendixand as illustrated in Figure 2 by three dotted lines. When not working the
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parent can choose to search actively for a job and incur cost º·c(h), which is shown on the
graph along the mixed (red) line.
Ashiftingpreferenceforfullandpart-timeworkhoursisrepresentedbythreedifferent
costs depending on the state variable h, which jumps to a new value each month with
probability ¼h. Costs rise slowly with m when, for example, children are in school and
part-time work has a low opportunity cost. Costs rise quickly with m when, for example,
children are young or sick or part-time care arrangements break down. When the value
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP II. The Environment Page 9of h jumps to a new value a working parent may change hours or quit and drop out of
the labor market. Either change may induce a change in welfare receipt. A non-working
parent may respond to a change in h by beginning or ending active search.
II.E Skill, Job Search and Wages
Skillisexpressedasafractionoffull-skill: x 2 f1=4;1=2;3=4;1g. Frommonthtomonth x
either remains constant or changes by 1=4 with a probability that depends on labor market
status. While working, skills accumulate with a probability m¼a. While not working,
skills decrease with probability ¼d. When ¼a = ¼d = 0 endogenous skill accumulation and
depreciation are eliminated and x becomes a permanent random effect for the parent.
TheMincerearningsfunctionthatrelatesskilltoaccumulatedlabormarketexperience
assumes ¼a = 1 = 1 ¡ ¼d. That is, the stock of skill accumulates linearly with experience
and does not depreciate while not working. For other values of ¼a and ¼d welfare spells
caused by transient conditions can last longer than those conditions. The longer a parent
is out of work the more likely skill has fallen. Wage offers fall and become less valuable
relative to time spent in the household. If a job were taken, x would eventually increase.
But in the presence of IA (even with forward-looking behavior) the rate of endogenous
wage growth may be too slow to make work pay.
Wages are expressed as full-time equivalent monthly earnings, denoted W (µ). Jobs
have two characteristics, b described above and an earnings offer n that takes on 6 values.
The offer n = 0 is a “dead-end" job that does not depend on skill and pays MW regardless
of skill. Such job offers are a fraction ¼m of all jobs. Job offers with n > 0 come from a
discretized log-normal distribution with log-mean ¹ and log variance ¾.
The wage function allows for an interaction between the minimum wage, skills, the
distribution of offers and the subsequent growth of earnings. To explain, start with the
simple case of MW = 0. Then, W() collapses to a familiar log-linear form:
lnW0(µ) ´ ¹+ ¾©¡1(n)+ ´lnx; n > 0: (10)
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isequallylikelyandtheparameter ´ correspondstothereturntoexperience. IntheMW=0
case n = 0 is not a real offer. When MW > 0 it is assumed that regular offers (n > 0) are
not each associated with its own level of earnings. Instead, for a given x let Áx denote the
fraction of the underlying distribution below MW:
Áx = ©
·




For the lowest x the lowest two regular offers produce a wage of MW. Each offer occurs
with probability (1 ¡ ¼m)Áx=2: For the next skill level (x = 2=4) only the n = 1=6 offer is at
MW with probability (1 ¡ ¼m)Áx. For greater skill levels no wages other than n = 0 are at
the minimum wage. So W (µ) =MW if any of three mutually exclusive indicators are true:
M(n;x) = B[ n = 0 ] + B[ x 2 f1=4;2=4g & n 2 f1=6;2=6g ] + B[ x = 2=4 & n = 1=6 ]: (11)
For other combinations of n and x the wage exceeds the minimum wage. Each offer is
equally likely given x. Let ~ n(x) be the number of offers above MW,
~ n(x) = 3+ B[x > 1=4]+ B[x > 2=4]: (11)
We arrive at the general expression for full-time earnings:










¹+ ¾©¡1(Á1 +(1 ¡ Á1)=5)
o
:
For a low-skill parent, minimum wage jobs differ in their growth potential. For some
offers they will wait for two increases in skill before pay increases. For others only one
increase is required.3 For high-skilled workers only n = 0 offers start at MW. All other
3 This can (loosely) be interpreted as the employer over-paying a worker whose productivity is below
MW and then eventually under-paying them once their skills increase to recoup the loss. However, no
explicit bargaining or contracting model such as Flinn (2006) is included.
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to quit a low-offer job to search for a better one (depending on such things as the job offer
probability and the risk of losing skill). Even a dead-end job is not really a dead-end
since it is assumed skills still accumulate on them. This allows for a pattern in which
people respond to the SSP subsidy in terms of employment but may not be on track to
self-sufﬁciency because it does not create a strong incentive to low-wage jobs with growth
potential versus those without.
II.F Value and Choices
Torecap,theexogenousparametersthatdetermineutilityandtransitionsaregathered
into two vectors,
¨ ´ (¯ ´ · ¹ º ¾ ³ ») (13)
¦ ´ (¼j ¼m ¼f ¼h ¼i ¼d ¼l ¼s ¼+):
Where: ¯ istherateofincomereporting; ´isthecurvatureinskill; ·convertsjobsearchinto
work time; º is the (scaled) income-equivalent cost of full-time work; ¹ and ¾ determine
the location and spread of wage offers; ³ determines the variance in the curvature of
time-costs over time; and » is the factor on outside support. The ¦ vector includes all
parameters that enter the transition from one period to the next: ¼j is the probability
that active job search generates a job offer (in the absence of job-ﬁnding support); ¼m is
the proportion jobs that are true minimum wage jobs; ¼f is the proportion of job offers
that are full-time jobs; ¼h is probability that the curvature in time-costs change; ¼a is the
probability that skills accumulate while working; ¼d is the probability that skills decline
while not working; ¼l is the probability that a working parent loses their job exogenously;
¼s is the probability that outside changes; and ¼+ is the parameter that determines the
effectiveness of the SSP Plus treatment described later on.
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v(®;µ) ´ U(®;µ)+ ±E[V(µ0)] = U(®;µ)+ ±
X
µ0
P fµ0 j®; µgV(µ0) (14)
8µ 2 £; V (µ) = max
®2A(µ) v(®;µ): (15)
State-contingent choice probabilities are smoothed with a logistic kernel with parameter
½ ¸ 0:
~ v(®;µ) ´ B[® 2 A(µ)]exp
n
½[v(®;µ) ¡ V (µ)]
o




Given µ and the choice probabilities the expected result vector is




Combining endogenous choice probabilities with exogenous outcome-to-state transitions
generates the state-to-state transition, Ps fµ0 jµg. Based on this transition there exists an
ergodic (stationary) distribution over the endogenous variables, conditional on the non-
ergodic values d and k (see Ferrall 2003). Let P1fµg denote this distribution, which is the
starting point for modeling the selection into the experiment.
III. The SSP Experiment
This section provides an overview based on the schematic representation in Figure 3.
The Appendix provides technical details. The oval represents the set of all outcomes (®;µ)
outside the experiment (the state space). This is phase 0 of the experiment, the real world
before random assignment to treatment. The space is partitioned into households which
receive IA (i = 1) or not (i = 0), the only endogenous outcome related to selection into the
SSP samples.
III.A Experimental Samples and Treatment
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Applicant Study (e = 1). Each experimental sample had two or more treatment groups (g).
The control group is denoted g = G = 3. Within each study there was a main treatment
(g = 2). In the Recipient Study there was also and a smaller SSP Plus treatment (g = 1).
The Recipient Study selected single-parent households that had been on IA for 12 out of
the last 13 months. This is simpliﬁed in the estimation and the ﬁgure to 12 consecutive
months on IA. Graphically, any sequence of 12 outcomes in the on-IA partition is eligible
for the Recipient Study. Households assigned to the control group remain in the real
world, and their transition from pre- to post-assignment status is reﬂected in a change
from phase 0 to phase 6, which is the real world after random assignment.
Eligible households assigned to treatment leave the outside world and enter the treat-
ment program. The Recipient Study starts in phase 2. Unlike phase 0/6, the treatment
program is non-stationary. This is represented in Figure 3 as rectangular areas with a
timeline below it.
The Applicant Study was conducted in British Columbia alone. To be eligible for
treatment the household had to apply for IA after being off IA for at least six months.
A feasible history for this sample is represented in Figure 3 by six connected points in
the off-IA partition followed by a month in the on-IA partition of the outcome space. If
assigned to treatment they enter in phase 1.
Phase 1 and phase 2 do not treat utility, only expectations about future utility. Thus,
if households were not forward looking these phases would be identical to phase 6 and
measurements would be identical (in distribution) in the treatment and control groups.
The treatment in phases 2-5 lasted 3 years and was discussed in the introduction and
illustrated in Figure 1.4
4 In the model, treatment phases 3-5 are identical and could be collapsed into a single longer phase. In
the experiment they are indeed separate phases, because in at most two months per year the recipient could
receive the supplement when hours fell below the full-time requirement. Modeling this facet would require
an additional state variable to track months below full-time.
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as the Recipient Study in New Brunswick. Subjects were given the same supplement
under the same terms, but in addition they were offered a set of employment services.
This additional treatment is not represented in Figure 1 which presumes a single wage is
already available. Instead, the potential impact of these services is captured by a change
in the job offer probability relative to otherwise identical households. The model assumes
that these services enhance active search by raising the probability of a job offer each
period:
pj(®;µ) = a[¼j + B[g = 1]¼+(1 ¡ ¼j)]: (18)
This leads to a change in the decision to search actively for a job and what is an acceptable
job offer. Active job search is treated as unobserved, and no attempt is made to measure
whether an eligible subject took advantage of the services. Thus, ¼+ is a measure of how
effective the offer of the services is not how effective the services are given they are used.
III.B Conditioning Variables, Impact and Predictions
Since Y(®;µ) does not include the full outcome, the analysis must condition measure-
ments on less information than households have. A standard impact analysis would
condition only on variables that are not functions of past behavior (given eligibility). That
is,
µcond ´ (t g e d): (18)
The variable t is experimental time. Usually this would simply be the number of periods
since random assignment, but the SSP has two different studies in which subjects enter
the same program of treatment at different stages. Thus, to coordinate measurements, t is





¸?(kjµcond)­fµ j k;µcond gE[Y jµ]; (19)
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The Appendix deﬁnes ­(¢) as the distribution over states observed at µcond among type k
households and ¸?(¢) as the selected proportion of type k.
Let ^ Y(µcond) denote the vector of average observed (empirical) results conditional on
the exogenous variables µcond. Observed impact is the difference in mean results between
a treated group and its control:











G means replace g in µcond with G (=3, the control group). The model’s
predicted impact is simply










Some insights can be drawn from these expressions without reference to the particular
model or experiment. While undergoing treatment the transitions are different from the
real world, so the treatment group drifts away from its control group. Selection on un-
observables is important if ¸?(kjµcond) differs signiﬁcantly from ¸[k;d]. Control groups are
driftingaswell,buttheycontinuetofollowthesametransitionsasoutsidetheexperiment.
Their state distribution converges back to P1 but only given the underlying (permanent)
type. Based on observables the control group outcomes converge to a different mean than
outside the experiment due to selection on unobservables. Ultimately, treatment ends
and treated households begin to converge to the same distribution as the controls. So the
impact of treatment in a ﬁnite-lived experiment is relative to a non-stationary distribution
that is converging to the same distribution as the treatment group but at a different rate.
IV. Experimental Outcomes
IV.A Measurements
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the analysis here. Roughly two-thirds were sampled from British Columbia, because the
Applicant Study was conducted in BC alone. The SSP Plus Sample includes 292 people
in New Brunswick. Roughly one-half of the households had more than one child at the
baseline. The results here use 36 post-assignment months of data (t = 1 to t = 36) in the
Recipient Study and 30 months (t = ¡11 to t = 18) in the Applicant Study. The result
vector is computed for each value of demographic, experimental, and treatment group
and by experimental time t.5
The 12 contemporaneous variables chosen for study are summarized in Table 3. The
monetary variables include mean monthly earnings, mean monthly IA beneﬁts received,
and mean monthly SSP supplements received (when applicable). The means of earnings
squared and IA squared are also matched because higher moments of these distributions
helpidentifythewageofferdistribution.6 TheremainingsixresultsinY(®;µ)areindicators
for labor market outcomes. The mean values are therefore proportions of subjects in the
given situation, including receiving any IA in the month, earning a wage within $.10 of
the current provincial minimum wage, not working this period due to quitting a job last
period;notworkingthisperiodduetolosingajoblastperiod,workingfulltime(according
to the SSP minimum), working part-time, and an interaction between receiving IA and
working either full- or part-time.
IV.B Experimental Impact
5 Attrition from the sample after the baseline interview is treated as an exogenous result independent
of the subject’s situation and the SSP treatment. According to this assumption it is valid to use either all
individuals reporting results in a given month or use only those individuals who remained in the sample
throughout the measurement period. Not all subjects entered the experiment in the same calendar month,
so in the 36-month data ﬁle there are some observations beyond the 30 and 36 month cut-offs. For a cell’s
values to be included in this analysis, there had to be at least 50 observations.
6 There is a lag in receiving SSP supplements and IA beneﬁts. SSP beneﬁts received and recorded in
month t = 2 are, for the most part, based on outcomes in month t = 1. For IA the lag is often two
months. For this reason SSP and IA results are forwarded by one and two months so that they are (roughly)
contemporaneous with the situation that generated them. This adjustment is not perfect, but it appeared to
be the best ﬁxed rule.








values of t. At t0 + 1 relative impacts are small, as would be expected with random
assignment. The only impacts that appear sizeable one month after assignment are 25%
responses in earnings and full-time employment in the NB2+ and BC1 groups. By month
13 (one month after the qualiﬁcation period ends) the earnings impact varies between
32% and 128%. By month 24 relative impacts are generally below the earlier maximum
impact, but in many groups is still larger than the initial values. The relative impact on
IA receipt is generally smaller than on earnings. By month 24 anywhere between 8%
and 32% fewer subjects in the treatment groups are on IA than in the control group. The
impact in the Applicant Study at month 13 is in the same range. The relative impact of
the SSP treatments on the proportion of jobs at the minimum wage is typically negative
and smaller than the other impacts. That is, conditional on working full or part time, a
smaller proportion of the treatment groups are working at or near the minimum wage
than in the control groups. The differences are small when compared to the impacts on
full-time work itself, which range from 52% to 146% in the Recipient Sample.
The impact of the SSP treatment is not limited to mean values of the measured results.
The co-relationship between the variables also differs across treatment groups. Table 5
reports the matrix of simple correlations in seven of the results. The SSP Plus Sample was
excludedandthefourdemographicgroupswerecombined, leavingfourentry/treatment
groups. ThemainpurposeofTable5istocomparethesamecorrelationbetweentreatment




differences in the Applicant Study. For example, the correlation between earnings and
IA beneﬁts among the treated is -.356. Among controls the same correlation is -.360. The
differenceinthecorrelationsissubstantiallylargerintheRecipientStudy, andthenumber
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correlations are -0.409 and -0.317, respectively. This is consistent with the model since
treatment is milder among applicants than recipients. For a minimum of twelve months
there is no direct impact of treatment on utility for recipients. The impact is felt solely
throughtheeventualopportunitytoqualifyforthesupplement, andthisforward-looking
impactisthesameasthatfeltintheRecipientStudyfromthestartoftheirpost-assignment
period. Fortheapplicantstheimpactisdiscountedby ± andbytheuncertaintyofﬁndinga
job. Thus, theapplicanttreatmentgroupwillonaverageappearclosertoitscontrolgroup
than the recipient treatment group. The one caveat is that the two groups are created by
nearly opposite criteria applied to IA receipt. As long as the underlying model exhibits
positivecorrelationinIAreceipt, thecross-treatmentdifferenceincorrelationswillindeed
be smaller in the Recipient Study. The presence of skill accumulation and depreciation,
along with persistence in the other household states and the IA rules themselves combine
to ensure some measure of persistence in IA receipt.
Table 5 suggests that analyzing each measured result (and impact) separately is inefﬁ-
cientinastatisticalsense. Thatis, earnings,IA,andfull-timeemploymentarenotseparate
outcomes that each requires a separate sequence of impacts. More importantly, the SSP
treatment is associated with differences not just in mean results, but also in correlations
across contemporaneous results. Even when not using individual-level panel data, the
different movements in mean results across variables through experimental time contains
important information about the treatment.
V. The Estimated Model
The model is estimated using Generalized Method of Moments by imposing the
conditions that the observed and predicted values of the conditional moment vectors be
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· ¢(µcond) ´ ^ E[Y j µcond] ¡ E[Y j µcond] = 0; (22)
forallvectors µcond postrandomassignment. Theinteractionof d, g, e,and twiththetwelve
contemporaneousresultscontainedin Y(®;µ)resultsin4884totalmoments. TheAppendix
describes the estimation procedure including computation of the optimal weighting ma-
trix. It also discusses how variation across samples, treatments, provinces, experimental
time and elements of the measurement vector Y(®;µ) contribute to the identiﬁcation of
parameters of the model.7 Some technical aspects of the estimation are show in Table 6.
V.A Parameter Estimates
Table 7 reports the estimated parameter vector. Since there are no coefﬁcients on
observed variables included in the parameters (as in, say, a Mincer earnings function)
many of the parameters are difﬁcult to compare with other results. Many of the values
are probabilities, but their magnitudes depend on the number of values the state variables
take on. For these reasons the discussion of the parameters is short whereas as discussion
of the model predictions is extensive.
The estimated mixing probabilities in Table 7.1 show that two types predominate in
BCandthreetypesinNB,withNB1primarilyofoneofthosetypes. Typeproportionsvary
more across provinces than between numbers of children. The dynamic programming
parameters in Table 7.2 indicate that types have very different levels of patience. A period
is one month. For only the ﬁrst two types is ±k close to 1 and place a large amount of
weight on the future. The other types make decisions close to a static manner: next
year’s outcomes have essentially no impact on today. The income reporting parameter ¯
7 One can treat a conventional impact analysis as estimating each difference between treatment and
control, ^ ¢(µcond), with a free parameter (the predicted impact is the observed impact). Meanwhile, the
estimated model generates impact as the difference between two of the model’s predictions without adding
new parameters. Thus, the model estimated using GMM can be seen as a nested hypothesis within the
unrestricted impact analysis. From this point of view, an impact analysis has as many parameters as
moments and has no power to predict out of sample. The estimated model is parsimonious, with only 72
free parameters.
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their income when on welfare. One type reports 95%.
Wage offer distributions differ across types (Table 7.3) as does the stigma associated
with welfare (captured by the coefﬁcient on outside support, Â). Full-time work has a
very similar cost across type (º), but recall that this value is relative to maximal earnings
for a given type. This contrasts with the cost of active job search, which is only large
and precisely estimated for type 1 (and to lesser extent type 4). Returns to skill and the
convexity in household costs are difﬁcult to interpret beyond their effect on predictions.
The last panel of the parameter estimates (Table 7.4) reports the transition shifters.
Here we see that type 1 is constrained by a low job offer probability. Most offers are
full-time, so the high fraction of part-time work reﬂects a choice to work fewer hours
than the job allows. Between 13% and 53% of job offers are true minimum wage jobs
(with no on-the-job growth potential). Estimates of the home environment indicate that
outside support is highly persistent (¼s is small) but household costs of work and job
search is not (¼h is high). Type 1 workers accumulation skills each period (and have rapid
on-the-job wage growth). For other types growth is slower, but still only type 3 has any
signiﬁcant chance of further growth after one year of working. Because average wages do
not accumulate in the treatment group, this suggests that the return to skill (´) reported
in the previous table is not large. Thus, parents achieve modest wage growth early in an
employment spell but not sizeable long-term growth. Only for type 3 is depreciation of
skills rapid while not working. Thus the impression the model gives for the SSP results
is that the treatment requires long-term and persistent growth in skills. Skill persistence
is much less of an issue than a predominance of jobs with no growth potential and a low
wage elasticity to skill accumulation.
V.B Fit to Selected Moments: Earnings, OnIA, Total Transfers
Figure 5a and Figure 5b present the observed and predicted moments for New
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the predictions track the data quite well. Selection and the evolution of state variables
together generates the upward trend in the control groups as they return to the ergodic
distribution. Theresponsetotreatmentgeneratesanimpactthatmimicsthedata. Theone
aspectofthedatathattheestimatesfailtocapturequalitativelyistheslopeofchangeinthe
Applicant groups (Figure 5b). The starting level and impact are accurate but the selection
effect in the Applicant study is larger than the model predicts. The fraction of each group
on IA is shown in Figure 6a and Figure 6b. The match to the data is similar to that for
earnings, although the mismatch in the Applicant study is of a different form. For OnIA
the model impact is too large before time 0. From the government budget perspective, the
SSP is valuable if additional transfers during treatment result in lower transfers later on.
Figure 7a and Figure 7b show total transfers, IA + SSP. Since the impact fades, the policy
is a failure in total transfers. In all groups and at each month the impact on transfers is
non-negative. The subsidy never induces a substantial move to self-sufﬁciency. In some
groups the model generates a larger impact than the data, but it captures the rise and then
near constant impact until month 36.
V.C Variation from Policy, Selection and Heterogeneity
Figure 8 illustrates the combined effects of all sources of variation. Each panel shows
the behavior of a particular unobserved type in all four observed environments. The two
most patient types, k = 1 and k = 2, are shown. Since preferences are held constant, the
effectofpolicyvariationisillustratedbycomparingthefourpanelswithineachtype. And
since the SSP is based on a selected sample the trends in the control groups capture how
distanttheselectedgroupisfromthepopulationaverage. Theergodicmeanisshownasa
triangle. Fortype1weseethatallgroupsarewellbelowtheaverageinearnings. Bymonth
36 the control group has nearly returned to the ergodic distribution. The most striking
aspect of the top half of Figure 8 is the large response to SSP+, which is a combination of
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fraction of the NB population so the modest additional impact of SSP+ is a combination
of a large individual response among a small part of the population. This same group
is not particularly responsive to the SSP treatment; its households are constrained by a
lack of job offers which the SSP+ alleviates. The bottom half of the Figure shows type
2. For this type the selection effect is more extreme and even after 36 months the control
group is still far from the stationary average. The impact under NB policies starts very
small and then becomes negative. Apparently this group was induced to accept low wage
jobs to qualify for the supplement while their control group counterparts held out for
better jobs. Those who qualify tend to keep these jobs until the subsidy ends. This group
illustrates one of the difﬁculties in designing incentive schemes for low-skill parents. The
SSP encourages employment but not necessarily patience to wait for employment with
highgrowthpotential. Theresponseoftype2isitselfheterogeneous,becausetheopposite
patternoccursunderBritishColumbiapolicies. Heretheexpectimpactinearningsoccurs
and is in fact quite long lasting. However, type 2 is estimated to be a vanishingly small
fraction of the population in BC.
V.D Treatment: Identiﬁcation or Validation?
The estimated standard errors reported in Table 7 indicate that many parameters are
preciselyestimatedbythevariationinmomentsgeneratedbytheexperiment. Theparam-
eters are identiﬁed by restrictions on how the moments can vary across treatment groups,
over time within a group, and across demographic groups. An alternative use of the
exogenous variation generated by the experiment is to validate a model estimated only on
the control group. Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Lise et al. (2003) follow this approach by
estimating models of forward-looking agents on control groups within experiments (Pro-
gressa and the SSP, respectively) and then using the experimental data for out-of-sample
validation. A major advantage of this approach is that behavior under the treatment does
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that the model that can be estimated from the control group alone may be not be as rich
as one that can be estimated using the experimental data. Thus, the parameter estimates
may be less applicable outside the sample and less reliable for understanding behavior in
populations facing similar but not identical environments.8
To quantify this potential cost of not using the experimental variation for estimation,
the standard errors for the parameters were re-computed using only the moments within
groups. Results were re-scaled to mimic a sample of the original size. Table 8 reports the
results. Standard errors based on all the data are compared to those from the control and
treatment groups alone.9 First consider the “Ctrl" column. It is not surprising that throw-
ing out the experimental variation increases the standard errors. However, for nearly all
the parameters the estimated standard error is eight times larger than when based on all
the data. Included among these are key parameters for understanding dynamic behavior
of low-income households: the discount factor (±), the wage offer parameters (¹ and ¾),
the return to skill (´) and many probabilities that determine persistence in wages and
other states. Thus, if the validation strategy had be used here, a model estimated from the
control data alone would have been much simpler in form without the ability to capture
some details in the experimental outcomes.
Another result is revealed in Table 8 when the “all" column is compared to the “Treat"
column. This counter-factual throws out the variation between treatments and controls
and replaces it with more information on the experimental variation. In nearly all the
cases the re-scaled standard errors are smaller when based on the treatment groups alone
andoftentheincreasedprecisionisnottrivial. Inmanycasesthestandarderrorisreduced
8 Todd and Wolpin (2006) suggest that if the model is validated then one might go ahead and estimate
using the experimental data as well to increase efﬁciency of the estimates. This retains any limits on the
identiﬁed model created by the limited variation in the control group.
9 The standard errors in the “all" column are slightly different that in Table 7 because in all calculations
the columns for ¼+ were eliminated. It was eliminated because it is not identiﬁed from the “Ctrl" group,
an extreme example of limited identiﬁcation from variation within a group.
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in incentives generated by the experimental design. Within the program of treatment
the next month is quite different than the current month since one deadline or another is
approaching. Within the control group no such deadlines exists.
This result has a somewhat surprising implication. When using social experiments
solely to study impact (¢(µcond)) a control observation and a treatment observation have
equal weight. Thus, absent other costs, splitting the overall sample evenly is a reasonable
design. Table 8 suggests that this logic does not hold when experimental variation will
be used to identify an underlying model. In this case impact is not the only outcome of
interest and an additional treated observation may be more valuable than an additional
control observation.10 When the ﬁxed costs of running a experiment and it is designed to
estimate an economic model then the treatment group should be larger than the control
group.
V.E Out of Sample Predictions
Figure 9a and Figure 9b compare the model predictions to data on earnings and OnIA
by province from the end of the experiment that was not available for estimation.11 Not
surprisingly, the impacts seen to fade in the previous ﬁgures continue to fade toward zero
as treatment ends and all subjects return to the status quo. The model’s prediction are
similar in trend but it continue to miss the the level of earnings in the applicant sample.
One pattern that is intriguing is that the impact of the SSP+ continues to lie above the
regular impact even after treatment ends. The impact decays more in the model, but it
also produces a lasting impact of the extra help in the SSP+ program.
10 In general, whichever group faces more exogenous variation is the key. Perhaps some experiments
actually reduce variation in the subjects’ situations and it is the control group that retains. However, most
experiments tend to be ﬁnite-lived and in all cases they create a ‘surprise’ that varies across individual
states. So typically the experimental group will be the one with more in-sample economic variation than
the control group.
11 Due to a ﬁnite research period promised to SSP participants, neither the micro data nor summary
statistics for the demographic categories used in estimation are any longer. The model predictions are
averaged to compute province-level predictions which are available.
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP VI. Policy Experiments and Other Implications Page 26VI. Policy Experiments and Other Implications
ThissectionconductsexperimentsthatexploretheimplicationsoftheSSPforcounter-
factual policy questions. In the ﬁgures the results of the hypothetical changes are com-
pared not with the data but with the model predictions based on the SSP experiment.
VI.A Experiments on Sample Design of the SSP
The SSP+ treatment was available only in New Brunswick and the Applicant study
wasconductedonlyinBritishColumbia. Usingthemodelthemissingexperimentscanbe
run. Figure 10 shows total transfers for NB 1 Child and BC 2+. We see that an Applicant
study in NB would have had a very large short-run impact but once treatment ended
those who qualiﬁed would quit work and return to IA. The pattern makes it clear that
in NB the predominant types can easily ﬁnd a full-time job before time 0, stay on IA to
remain eligible then at time 0 start collecting the subsidy. Since this ﬁgure extends to
month 60 it also reveals an implication not shown earlier in Figure 7a. Namely, the model
does produce a very modest negative impact on government transfers in the NB 1 Child
group. It occurs only near month 48 when all supplements are ended.
Another interesting pattern emerges if SSP+ were run in BC where job offers are a
major constraint. The extra job-ﬁnding help would not only have a major impact, but
it is negative almost from the start, meaning that total government transfers are cheaper
under the SSP than welfare. In BC good jobs (low supplements) are available but hard to
ﬁnd. Impacts are long-lasting. This prediction is out-of-sample and is possibly an artifact
of the model of heterogeneity. Perhaps the impact of SSP+ in job offers would not be so
high in BC because with more types the concentrated effect in NB would not be shared by
a large fraction of the BC population. This highlights the difﬁculty of drawing inferences
from experiments out of sample whether it is based on a response model or an atheoretic
impact analysis. Together with the modest negative impact in NB it also shows that the
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all the outcomes the responsive households are not common.
Next, for the Recipient Study consider a sample of single parents who are on IA for
exactly 6 months rather than 12 or more months. A practical reason for the or more clause is
thatitcreatesalargepopulationtodrawfromanditincludeslong-termwelfarerecipients.
On the other hand, if the SSP were implemented it would not be long until the people
qualifying for it would only be on IA for twelve months. The stock of long-term recipients
without the beneﬁt of the SSP would no longer exist. Perhaps an experiment on the ﬂow
into the long-term recipient pool would more closely reﬂect results of an SSP policy after
an initial transition period. Because the long-term response is so low in the recipient
sample an entry condition of just six months on welfare is used. This is an out-of-sample
change since many parents meeting this condition would not meet the twelve-month rule.
A reverse change is made to the Applicant Study. Parents newly applying to IA after one
month or more off as opposed to six months or more are eligible.
The results of this switch in stock versus ﬂow sampling is shown in Figure 11. We see
that this slight change in experimental design might have had a very different pattern, at
leastinNBwheretheimmediateimpactismuchlargeralthoughtheimpactstilldisappears
rapidlyoncethesupplementends. Thechangetosix-monthﬂowsamplingactuallywipes
outthe smallnegative impacton totaltransfers inthe NB1Child group. The conclusionis
that, even if the SSP had encouraged real policy reform it may not have provided accurate
guidance for the ultimate response since the stock of long-term IA recipients appears to be
much different than the ﬂow, at least in NB. For BC 2+ children households, the difference
with the actual SSP sampling scheme is modest, although we see that steeper slope in the
data in the Applicant group is similar to the model when "six or more months of IA" is
not enforced.
VI.B Alternative Treatments
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treatment are shown. One is a simpler and larger “re-employment bonus." This is a
policy in which full-time employment is subsidized for just six months not three years.
In addition, the subsidy is up to the full 3.9 times minimum wage earnings rather than
“half-way" to that same target wage. Based on the previous result the outcome is not hard
to guess, and Figure 12 shows the outcome for the BC 2+ group. This group jumps at the
subsidy and drives total transfers way up. But the impact on long-run behavior is even
worse than under the SSP. Thus there is some beneﬁt to the longer subsidy period, but
as illustrated earlier the SSP was not precise enough to encourage taking only jobs with
good wage growth potential. This simple bonus is even worse in these terms.
Finally, consider an experiment that would be difﬁcult to run but may reﬂect a policy
that is ultimately behind most reforms to welfare. Namely, consider offering the SSP
treatment while cutting IAB by 20%. Many parents who do not anticipate ﬁnding a job
will be worse off in this treatment, but real policy changes might likely combine the carrot
of the SSP with a stick of reduced IA levels. Figure 13 shows the effect for BC 2+ for
OnIA and total transfers. Recipients respond strongly to the cut in beneﬁts. Rates on
IA are much lower during the qualifying and eligibility phases. And unlike the actual
treatment the impact on total transfers are negative during the qualifying phase. But
as implemented, those who failed to qualify leave treatment and return to regular IA
beneﬁts. Rates and transfers return to roughly what we see in the experiment.
VII. Conclusion
Social experiments are designed to guide decisions based on a particular policy (the
treatment). As a by-product they create exogenous variation which can be used to infer
behavioral responses to other similar policies. That inference depends on a model, of
course. ThispaperhasfoundthatresultsfromtheSSPcanbemodeledinacomprehensive
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model captures quite well, but it failed to induce any obvious long-run move to self-
sufﬁciency. Out-of-sample prediction of the model are validated on this score as well. The
model conﬁrms the difﬁculty in affecting long-term outcomes for low-income households
through lack of job market opportunities, slow transitory skill acquisition, and short
decision horizons generated by low discount factors in some parts of the population.
Counter-factual experiments conﬁrm that related policies could induce greater short-run
response. Only in the case of the SSP+ treatment is there any hint of lasting impacts
among a fraction of the population. These are parents who are forward-looking and can
acquire skills but have trouble securing employment. With regard to the SSP+ the model
has intriguing prediction that stronger results may have been detected if the SSP+ had
been run in British Columbia where the population mix contains a higher proportion of
this type.
Beyondwelfarepolicies,thispaperhasexploredanalternativeapproachtocombining
models and experiments. Estimated standard errors computed after removing groups
demonstratequantitativelythatintra-groupvariationgeneratedbythetreatmentiscritical
for identifying a rich and presumably more generally applicable model of household
behavior. The literature emphasizes either inter-group variation without any model of
behavior or a reliance on variation within the control group for identiﬁcation. In the case
of the SSP either of these strategies is highly inefﬁcient in using the costly exogenous
variation generated by the experiment.
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VIII.A Details of the Model
Components of Income
TrueEarn(®;µ) ´ mW(®;µ)










Q(®;µ) = B[i = 1 & 2 · f · 5 & m > PT & W (µ) ¸ MW]
SUP(®;µ) = Q(®;µ)max
©
0; (1 ¡TB)[UL £MW ¡Earn(®;µ)]
ª
EndogenousVariables. Todescribethetransitionforeachvariable, let q0 = q?(¹ q;f¼jg;fQjg)
denoteadiscretevariable q thathasadefaultvalueof ¹ q nextperiodandcanthenjumpinto
one j different sets of values with probability ¼j (not the same as the model parameter).
Conditional on jumping into Qj each element of the set is equally likely.
S1. Unobserved Type: k 2 f1;2;3;4g
¦ Role: index into ¡ and the mixing distribution ¤.
¦ Transition: k0 = k?(k;0;;)
S2. Observed Type: d 2 f1;2;34g
¦ Role: index into the policy vector µpol and the mixing distribution ¤.
¦ Transition: d0 = d?(k;0;;)
S3. Household Time Cost: h 2 H = f1=4;2=4;3=4g
¦ Role: determine the curvature of the time-cost function.
¦ Auxiliary Equations
c(h) = ¡³ ln(1 ¡ h): (A24)
Therighthand-sideistheinverseexponentialdistributionwithdecayrate1=³ > 0.
The value of c(h) determines the convexity of costs for labor market activity less
thanfull-time. Forvaluesof c(h) < 1thecostfunctionisconcaveforfeasiblelabor
market time, creating a tendency to prefer part-time work. On the other hand,
costs are convex when c > 1, which creates a tendency either to stay at home or
work full time.
¦ Equation in Text: (9)
¦ Transition: h0 = h?(h;¼h;H)
S4. Outside Support Opportunities: s 2 S = f0;1=3;2=3;1g
¦ Role: determines the cash-equivalent amount of support available to the parent
that, if accepted, disqualiﬁes the parent from IA.
¦ Equations in Text: (8)
¦ Transition: s0 = s?(s;¼s;S)
S5. Upper bound on working hours: b 2 f0;PT;1g
¦ Role: constraint on work hours in current job
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¦ Transition:
b0(®;µ) Pfb0j(®;µ)g
0 B[m > 0]¼l
1 (1 ¡ pj(®;µ))B[b < 2]+ B[m = 0]
2 pj(®;µ)¼f
3 pj(®;µ)¼f
b B[m > 0](1 ¡ ¼l). (A25)
S6. Accumulated Skill: x 2 f1=4;1=2;3=4;1g
¦ Role: level of earnings and future growth potential




x;[m¼a + B[m = 0]¼d];[minfmaxf1=4;x+ B[m > 0]=4 ¡ B[m = 0]=4g;1g]
¶
(A26)
S7. Wage Offer: n 2 f0g [ N = f1=5;2=5;3=5;4=5g
¦ Role: search-sensitive component of wages
¦ Equations in Text: (10)-(12)
¦ Transition: with MW= 0,




n;[apj¼m;apj(1 ¡ ¼m)Áx apj(1 ¡ ¼m)(1 ¡ Áx)]; (A27)
[f0g f1=6;:::;(5 ¡~ n(x0))=6g f(6 ¡~ n(x0))=6;:::;5=6g]
¶
:
Note that the distribution of n0 depends on the contemporaneous state through
the value of x0. So between periods x0 must be determined before n0.
S8. Job Loss: l 2 f0;1g
¦ Role: exogenous loss of job.
¦ Transition: l0 = l?(0;B[m > 0]¼l;f1g)
S9. Employed Previously: p 2 f0;1g
¦ Role: tracks whether the person worked last period (with l can infer the parent
quit).
¦ Transition: p0 = l?(B[m > 0];0;;)
Actions.
A1. Labor market hours: m 2 M = f0;1=4;1=2;3=4;1g
¦ Equations in Text: (9)
A2. Active Job Search: a 2 f0;1g
¦ Equations in Text: (18), (9)
A3. Accept Income Assistance: i 2 f0;1g
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: (A28)
VIII.B The SSP Experimental Design
A subject’s status in the treatment program is deﬁned by the sub-vector µclock =
(t r f ); where f is the current phase of treatment, r is the number of periods the subject
has resided in that phase, and t is experimental time, which is deﬁned below. The SSP
program of treatment is deﬁned by a vector of parameters,
ªt[g] = (R[1] ¢¢¢ R[5] fn(y) PT TB UL): (A29)
In the SSP experiment there are seven phases, numbered from 0 to F = 6. Both f = 0 and
f = 6 correspond to the real, non-experimental world, before random assignment (0) and
after treatment has ended (6). By deﬁnition, control groups (g = 3) transit immediately
from phase 0 to phase 6. The treatment groups transit from phase 0 to the initial phase for
their treatment group (listed in Table A.1). Ultimately they reach phase 6 as well. Phase 1
is the entry phase, where a parent must remain on IA for twelve months to get a chance
to qualify for the SSP treatment. Phase 2 is the qualiﬁcation period in which the parent
becomes eligible for the SSP supplement if and when they begin a full-time job. They
remain eligible for the supplement during phases 3 to 5. R[f] is the maximum duration
of treatment phase f. Since each phase of the SSP lasts at most 12 months, R[f] = 12 for
f = 1;2;:::;5. The parameter fn(y) is shorthand for a set of deterministic transition rules
for next period’s phase. In other words, it describes how the SSP treatment progresses.
Table A summarizes the selection, assignment, and transition rules in the SSP.
The remaining elements of ªt are parameters that determine the value of the SSP
supplement, SUP(®;µ), which enters utility deﬁned in (A6) through income deﬁned in
(A7). The full equation for SUP(®;µ) appears in (A23). The red line in Figure 1 that passes
through OS and 2.9MW+OS illustrates the effect of the supplement on the household
budget.
The treatment variables r and f are not useful for coordinating observations across
groups. For example, one parent may take 8 months to leave phase 2 while another may
take only 4 months. After seven months the ﬁrst parent’s clock would read (7 2), the
second (3 3), and for all parents assigned to the control group it would read (1 6).
And the values of r and f are meaningless for parents assigned to control groups. Tomake
results generated by the model compatible across groups a separate data clock, t, tracks
the experimental month at which a measurement is taken.
VIII.C The SSP samples
A subject’s treatment group in the SSP is indexed by the sub-vector µexp = (e g);
where e is the experimental sample and g is the randomly assigned treatment status
within samples. The Recipient Study (e = 3) includes parents that had been on IA for at
least one year. The Applicant Study (e = 2) includes parents initiating (applying for) a




otherwise fn=0 R(f) phase name f
1 pre-random assignment 0
fn=0 fn=5 stay on welfare (i=1) 12 entry  1
fn=3 fn=1 i=1 or m<=PT 12 qualification for SSP  2
fn=0 automatic 12 year 1 of eligibility 3
fn=0 automatic 12 year 2 of eligibility 4
fn=0 automatic 12 year 3 of eligibility 5
1 post-treatment 6
new spell of receiving IA after a period of at least six months without IA. The treatment
variable g takes on three values. Besides a control group (g = 3) and a treatment group
(g = 2), the separate SSP Plus group (g = 1) was offered job-search and employment
services in addition to the SSP supplement. Each treatment group has associated with it




¹ µclock T H[y;µcond]
´
: (A30)
The elements of ªx are listed in Table 2. To make measurements consistent across
groups the experimental clock t must be coordinated. The time t0 corresponds to the point
of random assignment in the group and is normalized to 0 in the group that enters the
program of treatment last. Thus t = 0 at the beginning of the qualiﬁcation phase (f = 2)
which is when the Recipient Study (e = 2) is randomly assigned.
Prior to t0 is the period of sample selection. For the Recipient Study this period is
of length T = 12 and stretches back to tmin = ¡11. It requires the parent receive IA each
period, so only outcomes with i = 1 are feasible during this time. The Applicant Study
(e = 1) is randomly assigned at t0 = ¡11 and the selection period is T = 7 periods long,
extending back to period tmin = ¡17. In the ﬁrst six periods the feasible condition is
i = 0, and the last period is the condition i = 1, the start of a new spell of receiving IA.
One ﬁne point is that after random assignment the Applicant sample has already spent
one month on IA and requires only eleven more months to enter phase 2. Therefore the
initial clock setting has r = 2. Formally the selection criteria can be represented several
different ways. Table 2 represents them as a 0/1 indicator for a measurement vector y that
survives a period of selection. The indicator is denoted H[y;µcond] and it takes on either
the i component of the measurement vector or its complement » i = 1 ¡ i depending on
time period and the entry sample.
With all of the policy vectors introduced the policy sub-vector deﬁned as
µpol = (ªp ªx ªt) (A31)




-17 -16 ... -12 -11 -10 -09 ... -03 -02 -01 00
                 i   i   i  ...  i   i   i   i  
 ~i  ~i ... ~i   i
minimum wage job or not in computing mwgm. i means i=1 (on IA); ~i means I=0 (off IA).
for in the model but they are accounted for when classifying parents as working at a
aProvincial minimum wages changed during the experiment. These changes are not accounted
Yt[g] Yp[d]
UL TB PT g CB SA MW
a IAB d
0.00 0% 0% 3 712 1
3.90 50% 75% 2 755 2




tmin t0 T Init. r,f e
-11 0 12 1,2 2
-17 -11 7 2,1 1
are summarized in Table A.2.
With all transitions deﬁned, the primitive transition function as



















This notation means to take the product over all state variables q. Each state contributes
the probability that it takes on the value in µ0, denoted q0, conditional on P fµ0 j®; µg. This
is computed by ﬁnding the jump set that q0 is in (if any) and adding the default probability
if ¹ q = q0 at P fµ0 j®; µg.
VIII.D Conditional Distributions
To compute the selection into sample e by group d, begin by setting t = t0 ¡ T +1 and
g = 3, which determines the value of the conditioning vector µcond. Choose an unobserved
type k and use the corresponding ergodic distribution as the starting value:
­fµ0 j k;µcondg = P1fµg:
Initialize the selected weight of type k to one:
!(k;µcond) = 1:
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x means to set elements of the state vector to x holding other elements
constant. The condition B[t = t0] means this only happens at time t0. In other words,
subjects make their last choice before random assignment ignorant of the experiment.
Then during the transition to the next month’s state, those in a treatment group have
their clocks reset to the initial clock for that experimental sample. They ‘wake up’ in the
program treatment with all other states determined by choices before the experiment.
Working recursively forward in time ﬁrst compute the fraction of type k households














P? fµ0 jµg­fµ j k;µcondg
#
: (A34)
The proportion of the unselected population that is eligible for assignment may become




























Once t+1 = t0 we have the distribution eligible for random assignment. All of these cal-
culations can be done independently (in parallel) across both d and k. But once generating






Since the clock was set properly at t0, the updating rules (33)-(35) apply for t > t0 as
















becomes one. This assumes
that attrition is uncorrelated with unobserved types (and unobserved states).
VIII.E Solving the Model and Computing Predictions
ThesizeofthemodelandsometechnicaldetailsofthesolutionarelistedinTable1and
Table 6. The size of the system is notable. Even though each endogenous state variable
is restricted to a small set of values, an individual subject can be in one of 2,304 states
outsidetheexperiment. Thepost-treatmentinﬁnitehorizonproblemrequiresconvergence
of the value function at these points, although some points in the state space are, from
the subject’s point of view, redundant and do not require re-solving the maximization
problem (A14). For example, the household is not affected by the values of l and p, and a
currently unemployed worker (b = 0) does not care about values of n.
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of size 2,304 must be solved on each iteration of the model. The SSP program of treatment
adds 60 additional values of f and r. With the separate SSP Plus treatment and Applicant
sample over 4 phases leads to 51,840 total states for an individual. In keeping track of
all states while tracking experimental results in a total of 6,672,384 different combinations
are possible. Up to 12 actions are available at each state. When aggregating over all states
(including demographic, unobserved, and equivalent variation) the result is an outcome
space of size 80,068,608.
The value function (A15) is solved to a level of precision under the inﬁnite horizon.
Evaluating the model ‘from scratch’ takes a bit more than an hour using a single processor
of a high-end server. The required time is sensitive to the size of the discount factor
±. This cost can be cut by roughly 1=(16) through the use of 16 processors to solve in
parallel the separate problems deﬁned by d and k. Further substantial savings occur
when computing numerical gradients by taking account of the limited interactions across
parameters implied by a ﬁnite mixture model (Ferrall 2005). These savings are essential
to making the model feasible to solve. With the computing resources currently available
a full iteration of the BFGS algorithm can completed in approximately an hour.
Steps in Computation.
A0. Set µexog = µ0
exog and call an optimizer to minimize W(µexog).
A1. To evaluate W(µexog): Set d = D.
A2. Solve completely for one group d. Set k = K.
B0. Solve for behavior. Set f = F, r = 1, g = G, e = E.
C0. Iterate on V(µ) in 15 to convergence.
C1. Once converged, loop one more time over µend to compute choice
probabilities (P f®jµg in 16) and E[Y j µ].
C2. Solve the linear system that deﬁnes P¡1 for k and d.
C3. Solve for the endogenous sample in entry group e. Set t = tmin.
D0. FromP1,computetheﬁrstvalueof!(k;µcond)and­fµjk;µcondg.
D1. Increase t by 1. Update ­ and ! by looping through all
transitions.
D2. Repeat previous step until t = t0.
D3. Store ­ to be used for all g given e;k;d.
C4. Solve for behavior under treatment. If g = G set f = 0 and skip this
part.
E0. Decrease f and set r = R[f].
E1. Solve for V(), choice probabilities, and E[Y j µ].
E2. Decrease r by 1. Return to E1 until r = 0.
E3. Repeat the previous two steps until f = 0.
C5. Compute expected outcomes given k. Set t = t0 and restore ­.
F0. Loop through µend and setting the clock to ¹ µclock. Compute
E[Y jk;µcond] and update ­ for the next period.
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B1. Decrease g by 1. If g > 0 set f = F and return to section E.
B2. Decrease e by 1. If e > 0 then reset g = 2 and return to section D.
B3. Decrease k. If k > 0 return to B0.
B4. Compute empirical predictions. Set e = E, g = G, t = t0, and k = K.
G0. Loop over k to compute the sample-selected mixture for values of t, e,
and g that apply for d.
G1. Compute the contribution · ¢(µcond) to the econometric objective as
deﬁned in (22).
G2. Iterate on t through tmax, then decrease g and e until 0.
A3. Accumulate W(µexog). Decrease d. If d > 0 return to step A2.
A4. Use the optimizer to minimize the objective with respect to µexog.
A5. Iterate on the weighting matrix §, return to previous steps to compute ^ µexog.
VIII.F GMM Estimation Procedure
VIII.F.1 First Stage













0 §0 · ¢(µcond); (A37)
where §0 is a 12 £ 12 diagonal matrix with elements listed in Table 4. For the monetary
values the weights are the inverse of the grand mean of the moment over conditioning
states. Forthebinaryvariablesaweightof1=:5 = 2:0waschosentoavoidputtingexcessive
weight on turnover values which are near 0 and noisy across months. The cell sizes ncond
(in Table B.11) sum to 265,159 in (A37). The Appendix discusses how variation across
samples, treatments, provinces, experimental time and elements of the measurement
vector Y(®;µ) contribute to the identiﬁcation of parameters of the model.
Let ^ µ1
exog denote the parameters chosen to minimize Z1. From these estimates the
covariance matrix of the moments is computed. Given the random assignment to groups
and the assumption that demographic groups are different (exogenous) mixtures across
types, the moments are uncorrelated across groups deﬁned by e, g and d. That is, the
sequence of observed vectors Y(®;µ) for an individual is correlated, but across entry,
treatment and demographic groups the sequence of individual shocks are independent.
The population covariance matrix of moments is block diagonal with non-zero entries
only across t. There are 14 blocks varying in size between 326 and 417. To compute the
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exog following the model.
First, initial states are drawn from the ergodic distribution. Then an action vector is
drawn from the choice probabilities and ﬁnally a new state is drawn from the primitive
transition. Let Y r
~ t (µcond) denote the rth simulated path with vectors concatenated across
experimentaltime t. Thenthedeviationofthepathfromthemean E~ t[Y j µcond]iscomputed
and weighted by the endogenous type proportion for the type within the sample. The
outer product of the vector of deviations is computed and averaged across simulations.
The resulting matrix is a consistent estimate of the covariance of the block of moments for









~ t (µcond) ¡ E~ t[Y j µcond])(Y r





Based on this new weighting of the moments the parameter and ﬁt changed a great deal.
Therefore,thecorrelationmatricesiscomputedoncemorefromthenewparametervalues.









0 §(µcond) · ¢~ t(µcond):
The GMM estimates are then
^ µexog = argminµexog Z2(µexog): (A38)
Let D(µcond) denote the matrix of gradients for the vector ¢~ t with respect to the estimated
























The estimated parameters are identiﬁed from three sources of variation:
¦ Controlled and time-varying (path of treatment and assignment to experimental
group)
¦ Uncontrolled and time-invariant (variation in policy and demographic groups).
¦ Uncontrolled and time-varying (unobserved endogenous states and treatment
status)
The ﬁrst two sources are captured in the vector of conditioning variables µcond =
(t g e d). Different loadings on these three factors will produce different patterns
within months (across contemporaneous moments), across months (progress of treatment
andinitialselection), acrossstudies(differingselectionandinformation), acrosstreatment
groups (impact), and across demographic groups (variation in the mixture across exoge-
nous types). It is not possible to prove analytically that the estimated parameters are
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The sources of variation are appealed to roughly in the order given above.
Begin with the case of no unobserved heterogeneity (K = 1) and a simple parameter
to identify, the job-loss probability ¼l. In the model job loss occurs exogenously and
the SSP survey records reasons why a parent stop working. These were grouped into
losses and quits as reported in Table 4. Thus the proportion of working parents losing
a job each month is available in the data and is directly determined by the value of ¼l.
Since the observed proportions differ across demographic groups it is feasible to consider
unobserved heterogeneity in ¼l with different mixtures across groups. Of course, the
estimates of ¼l enters into all other aspects of the model.
Parents in the control group receiving IA do not quit jobs unless the convexity pa-
rameter c(h) changes value. And some parents go on and off IA with no change in labor
market status, which occurs in the model only when the level of outside support changes.
The measurement vector includes quits and IA status but not these conditional switch
rates. However, the joint movement over time (within control groups) of IA, labor market
status, and quits help identify the jump probability for h the jump probability for outside
support, ¼s. How the quit rate correlates with labor market earnings helps identify the
distribution of c(h) and thus ³. Mean earnings and the square of mean earnings are in-
cluded in Y(®;µ) so that two moments of the accepted distribution are available to match
the mean and variance of the offer distribution. Wage growth and duration dependency
in accepted starting wages identify the skill accumulation and depreciation parameters.
The correlation between income and welfare beneﬁts helps identify the income reporting
rate.
In a stationary model estimated on non-experimental data, the job search parameters
(cost of search, offer probability, proportion of full-time jobs) would have to be identiﬁed
through the reservation wage and the proportion of households working part-time (along
with parametric assumptions on the offer distribution already made). It is not guaranteed
that they would be identiﬁed in such data. The SSP experiment, however, includes
exogenous variation in the value of job search and the value of keeping a full-time job.
For example, the change in the proportion of people working part-time in the ﬁrst month
of the SSP (relative to the controls) picks up the proportion of accepted jobs that are
potentially full-time.
Now consider more subtle variation across the Applicant (e = 1) and Recipient (e = 2)
samples. An impact study focuses on differences between a treatment group and their
matched control group. For the Applicant Study, this consists of those who know the SSP
subsidy exists and can anticipate becoming eligible for it (i.e. they are in phase f = 1),
and those in the control group who cannot become eligible (f = 6). The model makes
clear predictions between the behavior of these two groups. The value of taking a job
and/orleavingIAchangeswiththetimespentinphase1. As r, themonthsresidinginthe
phase, approaches R(1) the higher the value of continued receipt of IA becomes among
the treated. The rate at which outcomes diverge across the two groups as r increases
reﬂects this approach to the change in phase. The change in the value of IA across groups
as R(1) approaches is sensitive to the transition probabilities. For example, high offer
probabilities imply the treatment group can afford to reject offers received earlier and/or
cease active job search. The pattern of impacts helps identify these probabilities, although
there is no one observable difference that can be matched to each parameter.
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if and when they reach the qualifying phase of the experiment (f = 2). From that point
on, any difference between the behavior of the eligible households within the two groups
is, within the model, forced to come from the difference in household states conditional
upon reaching phase 2. In the Recipient Study reaching phase 2 is exogenous to the SSP
and unexpected, whereas for the Applicant Study it is completely endogenous and can
be expected and partially controlled up to one year in advance. Thus, the two samples
provide experimental variation in unobserved household states caused by lagged decisions
made while anticipating different future opportunities. Many model parameters affect
thiscross-samplevariation. Forexample,ifjoboffersarerarethenparentsintheApplicant
Study may not respond strongly to the information they have relative to the Recipient
Study before assignment. As argued above, other variation in the data contribute to
identifying parameters like job offer rates. For purposes of this discussion, if we treat
the other parameters as identiﬁed without comparing the entry and applicant treatment
groups, then their comparison reveals the discount factor ±.
Theﬁnalparametertodiscussisthesmoothingfactor½. When½ = 0eachfeasibleaction
has equal probability independent of the household’s state. This allows for a conclusion
of completely ‘irrational’ behavior to be drawn from the data. The estimated model
avoids this result because it is required to match the overarching patterns across groups
and across experimental states that indicate systematic variation in choice probabilities
across states. For example, under complete irrationality, the proportion of households
receiving IA each month would be the same no matter the assigned treatment group or
how long ago random assignment occurred. Since statistically signiﬁcant differences in
choice probabilities exist across groups and experimental time, the estimated parameters
will choose ½ > 0.
The point of the discussion so far is that each of the 19 exogenous parameters interacts
with the design of the SSP experiment to affect speciﬁc aspects of the 12 matched results.
The arguments account for the presence of many unobserved endogenous states, but they
donotasyetaccountforunobservedexogenousparameters. Identiﬁcationofunobserved
heterogeneity in the parameters would be strengthen by applying the model to individual
outcomes, because the likelihood or the predicted moments for a single individual would
be conditioned on a single type. The computational cost of imposing these additional
requirements is, however, prohibitive.
Recall that demographic variation plays a restrictive role in the model. It deter-
mines the value of the policy parameters, such as the level of IA beneﬁts, which are
pre-determined and not free to explain variation in the data. The behavior of the unob-
served types will respond to the differences in the policy parameters but there are no free
parametersthatdirectlycontroltheinﬂuenceofthedemographicvariablesonpredictions.
That is, there is nothing like a ‘provincial coefﬁcient’ in the wage offer distribution or a
‘number of children’ coefﬁcient in the cost of time. Therefore, the model greatly restricts
the freedom to calibrate responses in order to match the wide variation in experimental
results across demographic groups. The only way for the estimates to gain more leverage
in explaining the wide variation across demographic groups is to allow variation in the
within-group proportions of each type. Thus it is likely (but not obvious how to demon-
strate ahead of time) that the mixture parameters ¤ will be identiﬁed from the data along
with differences in the underlying parameter vectors ¡[k].
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As of the writing of this draft, computer programs, data and output are available from
www.econ.queensu.ca/˜ferrall/papers/SSPinformation
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qend
qexp
children (from IA records).
Observations dropped:  invalid or missing age, high school attendance or number of
% of Total Subjects Description Index Vector
Demographic Groups d
19% 1728 New Brunswick, 1 Child 1
14% 1217 New Brunswick, 2+ Children 2
34% 3058 British Columbia, 1 Child 3
33% 2895 British Columbia, 2+ Children 4
100% 8898 Total
Treatment Groups g
48% 4305 Control 3
48% 4300 SSP Treatment  2
3% 293 SSP+ Treatment (NB only) 1
100% 8898 Total
Experimental Groups e
63% 5682 Recipient Study 2
37% 3316 Applicant Study (BC only) 1
100% 8998 Total
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP IX. Tables and Figures Page 46Table 3. Experimental Results (Moments) Selected for Matching
Description
1.564 3.439 450 $100 (1-bi)mW(a,q) Rep. Earnings  earn
43.470 62.590 470 $100
2 earn
2 Earnings Sq. earnsq
Fwd.2 mth 1.869 5.966 466 $100 IA(a,q) IA  Received  ia
Fwd.2 mth 27.593 57.782 466 $100
2 IA
2 IA Recv Sq. iasq
Fwd.2 mth 0.600 1.530 240 $100 SUP(a,q) SSP Suppl gsu
0.161 0.708 470 0/1 i Received IA  onia
MW+$.10
hrly w <=
0.059 0.777 470 0/1 (n*<6-#n)(m>0) Worked at MW mwg
Excl. job-to-job 0.004 0.003 456 0/1 p(l=0)(m=0) Left/quit a job  leftjb
Excl. job-to-job 0.004 0.004 456 0/1 l Loss a job  lossjb
0.088 0.223 470 0/1 m>PT Full Time  emft
0.023 0.130 470 0/1 0 < m <= PT Part-time  empt
0.045 0.161 470 0/1 ia * (m>0) IA & Working onXem
4884 Total
order of n in the feasible set.  For example, #0 = 1, #1/6 = 2, etc.
Table B panel.  Mean and standard deviation are across cells not individuals.   #n denotes the
A summary of the complete data listed in Table B.1-B.10. Count is the number of cells in
Note St.Dev Mean Count Unit Model Var.





impacts in () and in red. Largest absolute impact within the table shaded for each moment.
Difference betwen SSP and Ctrl columns in Table A divided by Ctrl column.  Negative
BC / 2+ BC / 1 Child NB / 2+ NB / 1 Child
Recpients Appl. Recpients Appl. Recpients Recpients
SSP SSP SSP SSP SSP SSP+ SSP SSP+ t Var.
0.13 (0.15) -10
0.04 (0.61) (0.25) 0.01 (0.25) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 1
0.67 0.35 0.53 0.32 0.89 1.28 0.39 0.51 13
0.31 0.20 0.70 0.74 0.30 0.58 24
(0.01) 0.01 -11
0.00 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1
(0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.21) (0.19) (0.29) (0.19) (0.24) 13
(0.08) (0.11) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.32) 24
(0.02) 0.01 -11
(0.03) (0.05) 0.01 0.00 0.00 (0.04) (0.01) 0.00 1
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11) (0.13) 13
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) 24
(0.06) (0.16) -11
0.21 0.12 (0.25) 0.06 (0.25) (0.09) (0.07) 0.11 1
1.17 0.52 0.98 0.36 1.46 1.65 0.76 0.97 13
0.68 0.57 0.90 0.86 0.64 0.90 24
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Applicants (e=1)
Group (g) ;  Obs. emft left mwg onia ia earn
0.655 -0.029 -0.678 -0.314 -0.360 earn
-0.375 -0.002 0.360 0.733 -0.356 ia
(3):42,056 -0.338 -0.011 0.302 0.720 -0.303 onia
(2); 40,875 -0.677 0.047 0.303 0.379 -0.668 mwg
-0.041 0.050 0.004 0.008 -0.029 left
-0.044 -0.672 -0.353 -0.400 0.640 emft
Recpients (e=2)
0.564 -0.011 -0.550 -0.294 -0.317 earn
-0.369 -0.018 0.330 0.692 -0.409 ia
(3); 95,302 -0.324 -0.021 0.267 0.733 -0.396 onia
(2); 96,220 -0.576 0.024 0.376 0.402 -0.608 mwg
-0.020 0.031 -0.027 -0.009 -0.018 left
-0.030 -0.611 -0.511 -0.503 0.638 emft
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Note Value Item
See Table 1 2,304 Size of linear system to compute ergodic distribution
Table 7.1-8.4 16 Number of Type-Specific Parameters (N)
3 Number of Common Parameters (C)
D*(K-1)+K*N+C 79 Number of free exogenous parameters 
16 X UltraSPARC-III
14 CPU Time to Evaluate Objective (min.)
19.426 Value of Objective (Z
2)
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Type Index (k)
4 3 2 1 Description d
0.0810 0.0911 0.8216 0.0063 NB, One Child 1
(0.019) (0.020) (0.006) (0.030)
0.4675 0.3253 0.2072 0.000003 NB, Two+ Children 2
(0.016) (0.016) (0.985) (0.860)
0.0000009 0.4771 0.00009 0.5228 BC, One Child 3
(0.014) (0.014) (0.429) (0.438)
0.0000151 0.4263 0.00009 0.5736 BC, Two+ Children 4
- - - -
GMM estimates based on (38). See (4) and (13) for roles of the parameters. Estimated
standard errors in parentheses is the square root of diagonal elements of (39).
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP IX. Tables and Figures Page 51Table 7.2. ^ µexog : Estimated Dynamic Programming Parameters (±k and ½k)
Type Index (k)
4 3 2 1 Description Var
0.742 0.476 0.934 0.9999 Discount Factor d
(0.023) (0.416) (0.081) (0.0005)
0.391 0.955 0.413 0.399 Income Reporting b
(0.019) (0.022) (0.040) (0.004)
6.103 11.507 99.192 36.220 Smoothing r
(2.463) (7.440) (143.937) (1.081)
GMM estimates based on (38). See (4) and (13) for roles of the parameters. Estimated
standard errors in parentheses is the square root of diagonal elements of (39).
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP IX. Tables and Figures Page 52Table 7.3. ^ µexog : Estimated Utility Shifters (¨)
Type Index (k)
4 3 2 1 Description Var.
0.020 0.025 -0.072 -1.560 Job Offer Mean m
(0.014) (0.020) (0.154) (0.045)
1.608 1.825 1.632 1.999 Job Offer St. Dev. s
(0.018) (0.235) (0.069) (0.014)
0.825 1.535 1.080 1.427 Outside Support c
(0.064) (0.023) (3.665) (0.037)
0.487 0.447 0.409 0.346 Cost of FT Work n
(0.025) (0.133) (0.767) (0.004)
0.081 0.000002 0.0007 0.461 Cost of Job Search k
(0.036) (0.002) (0.350) (0.036)
7.070 31.685 2.964 1.355 Return to Skill h
(2.352) (415.395) (30.406) (0.155)
2.997 1 / Mean Convexity z
(0.069)
GMM estimates based on (38). See (4) and (13) for roles of the parameters. Estimated
standard errors in parentheses is the square root of diagonal elements of (39).
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP IX. Tables and Figures Page 53Table 7.4. ^ µexog : Estimated Transition Shifters (¦)
Type Index (k)
4 3 2 1 Description Sub.
Market
0.831 0.99994 0.730 0.069 Job Offer (b>0) j
(0.028) (0.060) (0.510) (0.003)
0.902 0.99955 0.889 0.999996 Prop. Full Time f
(0.066) (0.206) (0.080) (0.000)
0.249 0.531 0.439 0.131 Prop. MW job (n=0) m
(0.030) (0.512) (0.321) (0.016)
0.002 0.018 0.0011 0.021 Job Loss l
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001)
Home
0.029 Support Change s
(0.002)
0.999989 Prob. Costs Change h
(0.002)
Skills
0.910 0.641 0.009 0.823 SSP Plus Effect +
(0.036) (1.060) (0.255) (0.015)
0.2601 0.1245 0.4787 0.995 Accumulation a
(0.016) (0.071) (0.898) (0.038)
0.1007 0.7654 0.0037 0.0006 Depreciation d
(0.009) (1.066) (0.021) (0.001)
GMM estimates based on (38). See (4) and (13) for roles of the parameters. Estimated
standard errors in parentheses is the square root of diagonal elements of (39).
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C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment





























































































































C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
























































































































C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment



































































































































C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
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C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment


































































































































C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP IX. Tables and Figures Page 61Figure 8. Variation from Policy, Selection and Heterogeneity
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C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
















































































































C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
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C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP IX. Tables and Figures Page 65Figure 11. Experiment 2: Total Transfers under Stock/Flow Sampling Reversal
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C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
C. Ferrall. Explaining The SSP IX. Tables and Figures Page 66Figure 12. Experiment 3: Total Transfers under Short-Lived, Large, Flat Bonus
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C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
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C: Recipient control; CA: Applicant Control;
T: Recipient treatment; A: Applicant treatment; +: Plus Treatment
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